INTRODUCTION
In Tishomingo, a small town in southern Oklahoma, Eddie Lee Howard entered into a seemingly unenforceable contract. 3 Howard had agreed to work for Nitro-Lift, a company that supplies nitrogen to oil and gas extractors. He also agreed not to work for any competing business for two years after leaving Nitro-Lift. 4 This last provision-a standard covenant not to compete-is valid and enforceable in nearly every state.
But not in Oklahoma. Under Oklahoma law, [a] person who makes an agreement with an employer . . . not to compete with the employer after the employment relationship has been terminated, shall be permitted to engage in the same business as that conducted by the former employer [and] . . . any provision in a contract between an employer and an employee [to the contrary] shall be void and unenforceable.
5
Howard put this law to the test. He left Nitro-Lift and immediately went to work for a competing business. He also filed suit in the District Court of Johnston County, Oklahoma, seeking a declaratory judgment that the covenant not to compete was void and unenforceable. As a matter of law, the noncompete was indeed void. But Howard had a problem: his contract also contained a broad arbitration agreement that required him to submit any dispute to an arbitrator. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), along with a mountain of Supreme Court precedent, left no doubt that this provision must be specifically enforced. 6 Recognizing this, the trial court dutifully applied federal law and dismissed Howard's claim. '" 12 and "once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law." 13 The U.S. Supreme Court was correct. Yet the Oklahoma court had its reasons. The problem in Nitro-Lift v. Howard was that arbitration might have led to enforcement of the noncompete-in contravention of (seemingly) mandatory state law. Why? Because Howard's contract provided not only that arbitration would take place outside of Oklahoma (in Houston, Texas) but also, crucially, that the arbitrator would apply Louisiana law. Under Louisiana law, Howard's noncompete would be valid and enforceable. 14 The result thus hinged on the forum. An Oklahoma court would disregard the choice of Louisiana law and void the noncompete. 15 What is not clear, however, is whether an arbitrator would conduct the same conflict of laws analysis. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has all but encouraged arbitrators to ignore the "complexity and uncertainty" of conflict of laws and simply apply the law that the parties chose. 16 If an arbitrator were to heed the U.S. Supreme Court's advice, apply Louisiana law, and issue an award upholding the noncompete, then the FAA would leave Oklahoma state courts no choice but to enforce that award, even if it clearly erred in its conflict of law analysis, and even if enforcement would contravene Oklahoma policy. 17 Nitro-Lift teaches us what most sophisticated parties already know: contracts 10 Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 20 (2012) . 11 Id. at 21 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 12 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2). 13 Id. (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994) ). 14 Section 23:921(C) of the Louisiana code provides: Any person . . . who is employed as an agent, servant, or employee may agree with his employer to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of the employer . . . [for a period] not to exceed . . . two years from termination of employment.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (2018) (emphasis added)
. 15 The Oklahoma Supreme Court referenced the parties' choice of Louisiana law, but did not even consider the potential conflicts analysis. Instead, it tacitly held that the Oklahoma statute applies regardless of the parties' choice of law. Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 273 P.3d 20, 24, 26-29 (Okla. 2011) . 16 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) ; see infra Section III.B. 17 See 9 U.S.C. § § 9-11 (2012) (providing the exclusive grounds for vacatur and modification of awards, which does not include public policy grounds); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984), discussed in Section I.D, below.
can bootstrap their way out of mandatory state law by pairing an arbitration provision with a choice of law clause. 18 States, it would seem, are powerless to stop this. Under federal law and Supreme Court precedent, there is virtually no circumstance under which a state or federal court may refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement or arbitral award. 19 Even awards that make egregious errors in law must be enforced. 20 But states have an interest in ensuring the enforcement of their own laws. They also have an interest in ensuring certain procedural protections for employees that a confidential, one-on-one proceeding cannot provide. 21 Given these interests and the constraints of federal arbitration law, what can states do?
In this Article, I propose a new strategy for states. The principle is to regulate contract formation, not contract enforcement. States should abandon contract enforcement as a policy lever-as federal arbitration law has all but forced this result. Instead, states should focus on deterring formation of contracts that would undermine state policies. This strategy leverages a simple fact: Arbitration requires a contract. Thus, no contract means no arbitration.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Throughout, I focus on the case of employment arbitration.
Part I reviews the last fifty years of Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence. The story, as I see it, is quite unsatisfying. Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence is primarily based not on the federal statute that governs arbitration (the FAA), but on a "national policy favoring arbitration." 22 The unsatisfying part is that this policy is a mistake-and not in the sense that it strikes the wrong balance. Rather, it is a mistake because it is based on an 18 On choice of law in contracts generally, see Sarath Sanga, Choice of Law: An Empirical Analysis, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 894 (2014), which analyzed all choice of law clauses in material contracts disclosed to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The most common choice was New York (27%), followed by Delaware (12%), and California (11%). Id. at 906 tbl.2. 19 See infra Part I (discussing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)). 20 See infra Section I.D. 21 Arbitrators are not under any obligation to adopt rules to ensure fairness of process in any part of the proceeding. Thus, basic rules such as service of process that apply in state and federal courts (e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 5) do not apply in arbitration. Further, arbitrators are not under any obligation to justify their awards in any way, such as by giving reasons in writing or orally. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) ("Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award."). The sole limits on arbitral process are listed in 9 U.S.C. § 10. These are restricted to egregious cases such as fraud, corruption, or refusal to hear evidence from one side. 22 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) ("In enacting § 2 of the [FAA] , Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration.").
erroneous citation to an early Supreme Court case, a case that all but expressly concludes that no such policy exists. 23 Beginning in the 1984 case of Southland Corp. v. Keating 24 and continuing to the present, the Supreme Court leveraged this policy to both expand the scope of the FAA and effectively eliminate its primary exception. 25 The primary exception, found in Section 2, provides that agreements to arbitrate are generally enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 26 Over the decades, the Court refined its interpretation of this so-called "saving clause," systematically foreclosing nearly all plausible contract defenses. It has also foreclosed defenses against arbitration's "fundamental attributes"-most notoriously, defenses against class waivers.
27 Yet despite these profound limitations on contract defenses, the Court continues to insist that the Section 2 saving clause is alive, and that arbitration provisions are still subject to "generally applicable contract defenses."
28 This is false. The employee may demonstrate this, for example, by showing that their own employment contract includes a noncompete. This policy would discourage employers and employees from forming, performing, or arbitrating noncompetes. Crucially, this policy would not be preempted by federal arbitration law because it does not regulate (let alone prohibit) arbitration.
The second example comes from the arbitration of civil rights claims. States and the public have an interest in ensuring certain procedural protections for employees pursuing these claims. Confidentiality in arbitration proceedings prevents a state from knowing whether these protections are in fact provided, or indeed whether civil rights are meaningfully enforced. Federal law would preempt any direct effort by states to prevent arbitration of any class of disputes. The strategy, therefore, is not to prohibit arbitration but instead to incentivize employers to give employees the option to litigate or arbitrate. States can do this by adopting an overinclusive policy: a blanket prohibition on civil rights as a subject matter for employment contracts. The prohibition could alternatively be for specific classes of civil rights disputes, such as sexual harassment claims. A subject 30 In response to Concepcion (under which courts must enforce class action waivers), Professor Janet matter prohibition, when again coupled with whistleblower rewards, can be structured to effectively grant employees the option to proceed (or not) to arbitration after a dispute arises.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing what this Article does and does not do. This Article does not argue in favor of or against arbitration per se as a dispute resolution system. Indeed, it does not even summarize the usual arguments. These arguments, as well as the relative merits of each state's policies, are orthogonal to the objectives of this Article. Rather, the objective of this Article is to diagnose a fundamental problem in contract enforcement-and then to offer one solution. The problem is that federal arbitration law prevents a state from ensuring that its laws are enforced in contract actions. The solution is that states should forget about contract enforcement and shift their focus to deterring contract formation.
I. HOW STATES LOST CONTROL OVER CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
In this Part, I begin by showing how U.S. Supreme Court precedent immunized agreements to arbitrate from virtually all plausible contract defenses. I identify the origins of the Supreme Court's "national policy favoring arbitration," which forms the basis of most modern FAA cases. I then briefly consider the Court's treatment of the enforceability of arbitration awards. I conclude by identifying a possible limiting principle to the otherwise seemingly unlimited ability of private parties to use arbitration to evade mandatory state law.
A. The Supreme Court's Position
It is self-evident that the Federal Arbitration Act provides some circumstances under which a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement. This is because Section 2 provides that, in almost 31 all contracts "involving commerce," a written agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
32
The Supreme Court seemingly agrees. On several occasions, it has held that arbitration provisions are subject to standard contract defenses raised by private parties. Under the saving clause of Section 2, it claims, "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements." 33 The Court has also 31 See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (providing exceptions business and customer lists. 42 It also secured ongoing consulting services from F&C, along with a promise that F&C not compete with Prima Paint in the painting business. 43 However, one week after making this promise, and to the surprise of Prima Paint, F&C filed for bankruptcy. 44 Thus, Prima Paint would obtain F&C's business and customer lists, but not its consulting services. 45 Worst of all, F&C's promise not to compete turned out to be worthless, as there was now no F&C to speak of. 46 Prima Paint filed suit for fraud in the inducement, claiming that F&C had knowingly misrepresented its financial position so that it could "sell" the worthless noncompete and consulting retainer.
47 F&C moved to compel arbitration under its contract's broad arbitration provision. 48 The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether a claim for fraud in the inducement must be sent to the arbitrator. 49 The majority concluded yes: the FAA, it reasoned, provides the "explicit answer." 50 Section 4 provides that a court shall compel arbitration "upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue." 51 In this case, plaintiff's claim was for fraud in the inducement of the contract as a whole-not for fraud in the inducement of the agreement to arbitrate specifically. 52 Therefore, as far as the Court was concerned, the "making of the agreement for arbitration" was not at issue, and the Court sent the case to an arbitrator. 53 Under this reasoning, any formation defense concerning the contract as a whole must be sent to an arbitrator.
The problem with this reasoning is that fraudulent inducement of the contract could imply fraudulent inducement of each of its provisions. Section 4 is therefore ambiguous at best. It does not provide an "explicit answer."
54
It only compels another question: whether fraud in the whole implies fraud in each part. Nevertheless, the Court admitted no such ambiguity and held that a claim for fraud in the inducement must be sent to an arbitrator. 42 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 397. 43 Id. 44 Id. at 398. 45 See id. 46 See id. 47 Id. 48 Id. at 399. 49 Id. at 396-97. 50 Id. at 403. 51 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 52 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 402. 53 Id. at 403-04, 406-07. 54 Id. at 403.
Prima Paint wiped out an entire class of circumstances under which a court could cite the saving clause of Section 2 to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement. Logically, we may partition all such circumstances into two classes of cases: (1) cases in which there are "grounds . . . at law or in equity" 55 to revoke the entire contract and (2) cases in which there are "grounds . . . at law or in equity" to revoke the arbitration provision specifically. Prima Paint rules out the first.
The Prima Paint majority does not mention any national arbitration policy, let alone one that could favor or disfavor arbitration. For that, we must turn to the dissent.
Justice 67 This statement-Justice Black's quotation of the Second Circuit's appeal to a "liberal policy of promoting arbitration"-is the first instance in which the Supreme Court references the idea that there exists a policy favoring arbitration.
Justice Black had argued in dissent that no such policy exists, but Robert Lawrence was adamant that it did. Robert Lawrence insisted that such a policy had been "consistently reiterated by the federal courts." 68 To support this assertion, Robert Lawrence cited several cases from the Second and Eighth Circuits. 69 It also cited an early FAA decision of the Supreme Court,
70 which upheld a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration. But this last citation is inapposite. Shanferoke is a straightforward application of the FAA. It neither refers to nor hints at a latent national policy, nor does it offer guidance on interpreting the FAA.
In any event, here in the dissent to Prima Paint lie the dubious origins of the national policy favoring arbitration-dubious because even the majority dismisses it. Though the Prima Paint majority expressly endorses Robert Lawrence's holding, it also expressly disavows its rationale, 71 1935) . 71 The majority noted that under Robert Lawrence, a claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally-as opposed to the arbitration clause itself-is for the arbitrators and not for the courts; and that this rule-one of "national substantive law"-governs even in the face of a contrary state rule. We agree, albeit for somewhat different reasons, and we affirm the decision below.
choosing to ground its holding in the text of the FAA. 72 Thus, the Supreme Court's original position on the existence and implications of a "national policy favoring arbitration" was either "no comment" (per the majority) or "nonexistent" (per the dissent).
But the Supreme Court would later see things differently. Fifteen years after Prima Paint, the Court made its second reference to the "national policy"-and on very different terms. We find this reference in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 73 an abstention case that only tangentially implicates the FAA. In Moses, the Court remarked in dicta that Prima Paint established that "Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary." 74 This is wrong. 75 The "liberal federal policy" language comes from the dissent. The Prima Paint majority expressly disavows such arguments. 76 In fact, in its sole reference to any policy, purpose, or congressional intent, the Prima Paint majority conveys the opposite sentiment: "[T]he purpose of [the FAA]," it wrote, "was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so."
77 It further expressly states that it does not rely on Robert Lawrence's reasoning on the policy goals of the FAA, and that its holding is based only on the "plain meaning" 78 interpretation of Sections 3 and 4. 73 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 74 Id. at 24. It further noted that "[t]he effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability" and that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Id. at 24-25. 75 76 See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 399-400. 77 Id. at 404 n.12; see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1645 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting the same). On this point, the dissent agreed: "The avowed purpose of the Act was to place arbitration agreements 'upon the same footing as other contracts.'" Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 423 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924)).
78 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404. 79 Id. at 399-400 (agreeing with the outcome of Robert Lawrence, but for different reasons); id. at 403-04 (interpreting Section 4).
The Moses court made an embarrassing mistake. It must have read Justice Black's critique of Robert Lawrence and then mistakenly presumed he was critiquing the Prima Paint majority. Then again, the Moses dicta was just that-dicta. It had no bearing on the case at hand. It might have been forgotten.
Expansion to State Court
Moses was not forgotten. The third and most consequential reference to the national policy is found in the 1984 case of Southland Corp. v. Keating.
80
The majority would base its entire argument on a citation to the national policy statement from Moses. This case would also mark the beginning of the end of mandatory contract law.
Southland issued two holdings, one general, the other specific. The general holding is that the FAA applies not just in federal court but also in state court. 81 The specific holding is that the saving clause did not apply to the arbitration provision at issue. 82 The specific holding, and particularly the process by which it was reached, is what marks the beginning of the end of mandatory contract law. Yet the specific holding is also the least remembered. Indeed, neither the majority nor the dissent paid any attention to it. I next consider each holding in turn.
Southland originated in state court, and so the threshold question was whether the FAA applied. 83 First, consider Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's answer. Writing in dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the FAA's direct references to federal courts, along with the conspicuous absence of any reference to state courts, were sufficient to conclude that the FAA applied only in the former. 84 Section 4 provides that a party aggrieved by another's refusal to arbitrate "may petition any United States district court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement." 85 Section 3 further provides that
[i]f any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration . . . the court . . . shall on application of 80 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 81 Id. at 14-15. 82 Id. at 15 ("[I]t is clear beyond question that if this suit had been brought as a diversity action in a federal district court, the arbitration clause would have been enforceable."). 83 If it did, then two subsequent questions would emerge: Did Section 2 oblige the state court to enforce the arbitration provision at issue? And did Section 4 further oblige the state court to specifically enforce the arbitration provision at issue? These questions were never directly posed by the Court. Instead, the Court declared that the answers to these questions were "clear beyond question." Id. 84 Id. at 22-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 85 Id. at 22 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
86
In Justice O'Connor's view, this was sufficient to hold that the FAA applies only in federal court. The reasoning, it would seem, is self-evident. The statute does not say "court" or "any court." It says "United States district court." For Justice O'Connor, this was as plain as plain meaning could be.
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But the majority held otherwise. The majority did not address or even acknowledge the references to "United States courts" in Sections 3 and 4. The sole basis for its opinion is a citation to Moses for the proposition that "[i]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration."
88 This policy, it held, was sufficient to conclude that the FAA-in its entirety-applies to state courts. 89 Thus, what began as an embarrassing mistake in Moses became the foundation for the Court's arbitration jurisprudence.
States Strike Back
Southland is the watershed arbitration case. It expanded the FAA's jurisdictional scope-and therefore the extent to which parties could specifically enforce an arbitration provision. Before Southland, a contract needed an independent jurisdictional hook to make it into federal court and trigger the application of the FAA's specific performance remedy. Typically, the hook was diversity. 90 An arbitration provision, by itself, was not-and 86 Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3). 87 Id. at 29. Justice O'Connor also cites Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 30. For example, the holding in Prima Paint expressly applied to federal courts. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) ("We hold, therefore, that in passing upon a [Section 3] application for a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate." (emphasis added)). 88 Southland, 465 U.S. at 10 (majority opinion). 89 Id. The majority also offered a quasi-textual (and nonsensical) argument: Congress could have directed federal courts to specifically enforce all arbitration provisions, not just those in contracts "involving commerce." Because Congress limited the Act to contracts within the reach of the Commerce Clause, it must have intended the Act to apply in both federal and state courts. Id. at 15. This is nonsense because Congress could have intended both. That is, Congress could have intended the Act to apply only to contracts that (1) are litigated in federal courts and (2) involve commerce. Justice Thomas similarly observed that the Section 2 argument was, in his words, the Southland majority's only "real response" to Sections 3 and 4 of the statute. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 292 (1995).
Yet Congress might well have thought that even if it could have called upon federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements in every single case that came before them, there was no federal interest in doing so unless interstate commerce or maritime transactions were involved. This conclusion is far more plausible.
Id. Indeed, there would be no federal interest in disturbing the jurisdiction of state courts over noncommercial contracts, such as agreements under family law. 90 Until 2009, it was not clear whether a court may alternatively rely on the federal nature of the underlying dispute as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. In Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 53 still is not-sufficient grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction. 91 After Southland, no such hook was needed. Specific performance was now available in state court. Parties to any contract "involving commerce" could now specifically enforce a valid arbitration provision.
Southland is also a turning point for the Supreme Court's docket. Table 1 shows that the volume of its arbitration cases increased significantly, while Figure 1 shows that arbitration-related disputes continue to consume an ever-increasing share of the Court's caseload. 101 Even after Southland (and perhaps because of it), many states enacted laws regulating arbitration. Some states continue to maintain laws that would clearly be preempted under Supreme Court precedent. Georgia, for example, requires that employees specifically initial the arbitration clause. GA. CODE ANN. 
C. The End of Contract Defenses

The Key Move
Southland's general holding-applying the FAA to state courts-has been roundly criticized by scholars. 102 But it is its second holding that has led to the unraveling of mandatory contract law.
The second holding tacitly placed a new limit on the saving clause of Section 2. Recall that Prima Paint rules out cases for which there exist "grounds . . . at law or in equity" 103 to revoke the entire contract. Thus, even before Southland, a court could refuse to enforce an agreement to arbitrate only if there were "grounds . . . at law or in equity" to revoke the arbitration provision specifically.
The arbitration provision at issue in Southland came from the standard franchise agreement of Southland Corporation (the erstwhile corporate name of 7-Eleven federal statute. 106 Thus, to specifically enforce the arbitration provision, the Southland majority's opinion needed not only to hold that the FAA applies in state court but also that it preempts the California Supreme Court's interpretation of its statute as "grounds as exist at law or in equity" upon which to refuse enforcement.
107
The Court so held. The body of the majority opinion provides no reason for this holding.
108 But a final footnote offers a hint:
[A] party may assert general contract defenses such as fraud to avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement. We conclude, however, that the defense to arbitration found in the California Franchise Investment Law is not a ground that exists at law or in equity "for the revocation of any contract" but merely a ground that exists for the revocation of arbitration provisions in contracts subject to the California Franchise Investment Law.
109
The idea, it seems, is that state law cannot single out arbitration. The Supreme Court slowly refined this idea over time. way the clause establishes a sort of 'equal-treatment' rule for arbitration contracts."
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If one were to take these statements at face value, one might conclude that the Supreme Court has in fact adopted a position of neutrality or "equal treatment" with respect to arbitration. But while the logic of "general applicability" sounds neutral in theory, in practice it is not.
The problem is that when the Supreme Court applies this idea to actual cases, it mischaracterizes the nature of a "generally applicable" contract defense. What makes a contract defense "generally applicable"? The answer is not that, when applied, the argument advancing the defense eschews specificity or merely calls upon some general proposition like "pacta sunt servanda" (agreements must be kept). "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." 115 There is no such thing as a "general" contract argument. Rather, what makes a defense generally applicable is that the style of argument could apply to a diversity of exchanges. When applied to an actual case, a general defense necessarily derives its meaning from specific facts of that exchange. To argue a general defense such as unconscionability or fraud, one must attack a specific provision of the agreement, or a specific representation of one party, or a specific belief of one party, or a specific fact of the world-or some combination thereof. Thus, a generally applicable defense, while general in theory, is necessarily specific in application.
The Supreme Court's key move-the one that quietly annihilates a whole class of potential defenses-is that it characterizes a "generally applicable" defense as one that does not "derive [its] meaning from" a specific fact of arbitration. The move here is not to foreclose any contract defense. Instead, the move is to foreclose the application of any contract defense.
Consider two examples. Suppose one person compliments another's dancing performance. There is nothing inherently fraudulent about this specific fact. If, however, the compliment were disingenuous and made only to induce the receiver to purchase more dance lessons, then this compliment may become fraudulent within the context of that exchange. 116 Similarly, suppose one party pays another $450 in exchange for a promise to either perform some task or return the money. The promise to return the money is 114 enforceable-at least generally and in the abstract. But if the payment were a bribe in exchange for a political favor, then this otherwise innocuous promise to repay becomes unenforceable as a matter of public policy. 117 The lesson of these two examples is simple. Terms or features of the bargaining process that are innocuous in isolation (such as compliments or promises to repay) may, within the context of a specific exchange, become fraudulent, or unconscionable, or against public policy.
The same applies to arbitration. Like a gratuitous compliment or a simple promise to repay, there is nothing inherently fraudulent or unconscionable about arbitration. In the context of a specific exchange, however, an otherwise innocuous arbitration provision may, like a compliment or promise to repay, become unconscionable or fraudulent.
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Imagine what would happen if the same limit that the Supreme Court applies to arbitration provisions were applied to the two examples above. That is, imagine that a party may raise a "generally applicable contract defense"-but only if the defense does not "derive its meaning" from the fact that either (1) a compliment or (2) a promise to repay is at issue. How could either case be argued? How could the victim of a fraudulently induced dancing lesson actually apply the formation defense of fraud in the inducement without reference to the compliment? She could not. Or how could a court refuse to enforce the bribery contract if federal law barred a public policy defense from "deriv[ing] its meaning" from the fact that a promise to repay is at issue? It could not. Thus, the Court's key moveforeclosing defenses that, when applied, reference any element of arbitration-prevents parties from applying "generally applicable" defenses. 117 It would be a mistake to interpret the Court's neutral language as advancing neutral policy, one that merely treats arbitration provisions like any other, or, as the Southland court put it, one that honors the "congressional intent to place arbitration agreements 'upon the same footing as other contracts. '" 122 Under Prima Paint, a court may only decide "issues relating 119 See, e.g., Masco Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 624, 630 (6th Cir. 2004) (a claim for mutual mistake must be resolved by the arbitrator). It is not possible to mount a defense premised on mistake. A party would have to show not only that the nonexistence of the arbitration provision was a basic assumption upon which the contract was made but also that enforcing the arbitration provision would either (a) materially adversely affect her (if the mistake were mutual) or (b) lead to an "unconscionable" result (if the mistake were unilateral). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § § 152-54. Neither defense is permissible because it would require a specific holding that compelling arbitration would, in fact, materially adversely affect one of the parties, and therefore that the arbitral forum itself is somehow inadequate. Again, such a holding would necessarily "single out" features of the arbitral process. . 2016) . The Supreme Court has never heard a capacity case, but it would almost surely hold that such disputes must be sent to the arbitrator. Capacity applies to the formation of the contract in its entirety, not to the inclusion of any specific provision. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § § 14 (infancy), 15 (mental illness). The Court's rule in such instances is categorical: "[U]nless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance." Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006) . For the capacity defense to apply only to the arbitration clause, it must be that the agreement to arbitrate was formed separately. That is, it must be that a capable party formed a contract without an arbitration agreement, subsequently became incapable, and, while incapable, modified the existing contract with the arbitration agreement.
121 This defense is implausible. A claim that the contract was formed under physical duress or coercion goes to formation of the contract as a whole. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174. Again, this defense would be sent to the arbitrator. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967). Any other duress defense would require a showing that the aggrieved party assented only because of another's "improper threat," such as a crime or tort, and that the threat left the aggrieved party with "no reasonable alternative." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § § 175(1) (improper threat by the counter-party), 175(2) (improper threat by a third party), 176 (defining an improper threat). But the "alternative" to arbitration is the public courts. Assessing the reasonableness of this alternative would require a comparison of arbitration and litigation, which in turn would rely on facts specific to arbitration. See, e.g., Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124 (1971) (on economic duress generally). Thus, we are again left with only one contrived possibility: Two parties form a valid contract without an arbitration provision; then one party physically compels the other to modify it by including an arbitration provision. 122 to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate." 123 It must send any defense relating to the validity of the contract as a whole to an arbitrator. Yet under Southland and subsequent cases, a defense may not cite any specific feature of the arbitral forum or the arbitration provision at issue.
In summary, the saving clause of Section 2 of the FAA expressly provides grounds for refusing to enforce an arbitration provision. But, according to the Supreme Court, a defense that implicates the arbitration provision is barred, while a defense that does not implicate the arbitration provision is sent to the arbitrator. The Supreme Court has Catch 22-ed the saving clause out of existence.
The End of State Policies
In a separate opinion to Southland, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice John Paul Stevens anticipated how eliminating the saving clause would affect a state's public policy. 124 Justice Stevens agreed with the majority on the first issue: even if Congress intended that the FAA apply only in federal courts, "intervening developments in the law"-presumably, Supreme Court precedent-required the Court to hold that the FAA applies equally in state courts. 125 However, Justice Stevens was alarmed by the Southland majority's second holding and its casual dismissal of the saving clause:
For me it is not "clear beyond question that if this suit had been brought as a diversity action in a federal district court, the arbitration clause would have been 123 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404. An additional issue arises if the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself: whether the parties agreed to submit questions of arbitrability (as distinct from the underlying merits) to an arbitrator or to a court. On this issue, the Supreme Court has held that the default rule is the court. First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) . Some scholars have argued that First Options introduces ambiguity into the application of the separability rule and Prima Paint. See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 59, at 872-78. But it does not. In First Options, the plaintiff Kaplan had concluded several related contracts with First Options. Some were in his own name; others were on behalf of his wholly owned company. Only the latter contract, however, had an arbitration provision. The arbitrability question was whether the former agreements were also subject to arbitration. 514 U.S. at 940-42. First Options was therefore the very rare case in which only the formation of the agreement to arbitrate-and not the formation of the agreement as a whole-was at issue. The FAA unambiguously declares that this issue is for the court. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (conditioning a court's duty to specifically enforce an agreement to arbitrate "upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue") (emphasis added); 9 U.S.C. § 3 (conditioning a court's duty to stay court proceedings pending arbitration on the same). This distinction, between the agreement to arbitration versus the agreement as a whole, is the logic of Prima Paint. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 403; see also supra Section I.B.1 (on dubious origins). 124 In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, Justice Thomas issued a separate concurrence that mirrors the concerns of Justice Stevens's separate opinion in Southland, specifically, that the scope of preemption implicit in the majority's holding is confusing and threatens to swallow the saving clause. See 563 U.S. 333, 353, 356 (2011) . 125 Southland, 465 U.S. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
enforceable." The general rule prescribed by § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act is that arbitration clauses in contracts involving interstate transactions are enforceable as a matter of federal law. That general rule, however, is subject to an exception based on "such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." I believe that exception leaves room for the implementation of certain substantive state policies that would be undermined by enforcing certain categories of arbitration clauses. (1991)). But the Court shut this down in 2013. It reasoned that "effective vindication" of a federal claim does not require that a person retain the ability to pursue the federal claim; it merely requires that a person retain the right to bring the claim. Thus, a court may enforce an arbitration provision even if enforcement disables a party from actually bringing the federal claim. See Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 235-38 (holding that the "effective vindication" exception does not invalidate a class waiver, even if plaintiff's cost of individually arbitrating the federal claim exceeds the potential recovery); see also id. at 239 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
130 Southland, 465 U.S. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Grounds for Appeal
Two key features of arbitration enable parties to escape mandatory contract law: (1) arbitrator power and (2) award finality. On the first, the remedial powers of an arbitrator are at least as broad as those of a judge, and possibly more so. 131 On the second, the FAA limits the grounds under which courts may refuse to enforce an award. These grounds are limited to extreme procedural defects such as "fraud, . . . evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, . . . The standard of review cannot be altered in contract and leaves no room to consider the merits of an award. 133 Thus, an arbitrator's award is nearly unappealable. Egregious errors in law or fact are not sufficient grounds for review.
134 "Of course, decisions procured by the parties through fraud or through the arbitrator's dishonesty need not be enforced," yet "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." and Supreme Court precedent compels the conclusion that, no matter how egregious the error in law, a court must confirm the award. Yet there must be some limit. At the very least, there are limits outside of arbitration law that would deter a party from asking a court to enforce an agreement to arbitrate. These include, for example, laws that attach criminal liability to price-fixing or human-trafficking agreements. 136 Further, even if an arbitrator awarded damages for breach of a price-fixing or humantrafficking scheme, it seems unlikely that any court would confirm it. This much seems obvious.
But why is this obvious? Is it because there exists some limiting principle within the FAA or the Supreme Court's arbitration precedent? Strictly speaking, I think not.
There is, however, one doctrine-the "manifest disregard" standardthat, though courts do not expressly declare it as such, I would reinterpret as a limiting principle that responds to this concern. Manifest disregard is a judge-made standard to review arbitration awards. The phrase comes from the Supreme Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan.
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The Second Circuit interpreted Wilko as introducing a standard for vacatur outside the FAA. The Second Circuit admitted that the bounds of the new manifest disregard standard were not well-defined, 138 yet "it clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law" 139 -that is, more than what the FAA allows. The Second Circuit eventually fashioned a two-prong test consisting of objective and subjective components, both of which must be met before a court may refuse to confirm the award. 140 The objective prong asks "whether the governing law alleged to have been 136 See, e.g., Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1. In rare cases, some lower courts have refused to enforce an award on public policy grounds. The Wilko Court was explaining that arbitration would undercut the Securities Act's buyer protections when it remarked (citing FAA § 10) that "[p]ower to vacate an [arbitration] award is limited," and went on to say that "the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard [of the law] are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation."
Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 584 (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37) (internal citations omitted). 138 ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable." 141 The subjective prong "look[s] to the knowledge actually possessed by the arbitrator" and asks whether "the arbitrator appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore or pay no attention to it." 142 The Supreme Court, however, resisted interpreting manifest disregard as something more than what the FAA allows. In Hall Street v. Mattel, 143 one of the litigants asked the Supreme Court to recognize manifest disregard as separate grounds for vacating awards. 144 The Court declined, equating this with a request for "general review for an arbitrator's legal errors." 145 Yet the Court equivocated. It wondered aloud whether Wilko's phrase introduced new grounds for review or was merely a shorthand reference to the statutory grounds collectively. 146 Given its categorical holding that "the statutory grounds [for vacatur] are exclusive," 147 some courts concluded that manifest disregard did not survive Hall Street. 148 Others, however, arrived at the opposite conclusion, and the issue arose again in the 2010 case of Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds.
149
The Second Circuit had reasoned that while manifest disregard was not a separate, non-statutory grounds for review, it nevertheless survived Hall Street as a "judicial gloss" on the statutory grounds of Section 10. 150 The Second Circuit then applied the manifest disregard "gloss" to vacate an arbitration award.
Like the Seventh Circuit, we view the "manifest disregard" doctrine, and the FAA itself, as a mechanism to enforce the parties' agreements to arbitrate rather than as judicial review of the arbitrators' decision. We must therefore continue to bear the responsibility to vacate arbitration awards in the rare instances in which the arbitrator knew of the relevant legal principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari but again avoided the manifest disregard question by affirming the Second Circuit decision on statutory grounds. It held that the arbitrator had exceeded its powers by expressly basing the award on its own public policy judgment (instead of on applicable law). 152 Further, it expressly declined to decide whether manifest disregard survived Hall Street, 153 though it did awkwardly leave the door open by asserting that, if the standard did apply, it would have been satisfied in this case.
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I think the Stolt-Nielsen Court unintentionally but effectively incorporates a limiting principle into the statutory grounds for vacatur. It accomplished this by holding, as a matter of law, that an arbitration panel which imposes its own policy choice "exceeds its powers" under Section 10. 155 In this way, Stolt-Nielsen smuggles the subjective prong of manifest disregard-that "the arbitrator must appreciate the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decide[] to ignore or pay no attention to it"
156 -into one of the FAA's statutory grounds for vacatur, namely, excession of powers.
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Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 95 (alterations omitted). The Second Circuit's argument is flawed. Stripped to its essentials, it offers prudential grounds for the proposition that something akin to "willful misapplication of the law" should be grounds for vacating an award. This argument ignores Hall Street's holding that the statutory grounds are exclusive. However, the Second Circuit's conclusion-that manifest disregard survives Hall Street-could be supported. A more logically sound argument would support that conclusion by reasoning either (1) the statutory grounds in Section 10 collectively imply manifest disregard, or (2) manifest disregard is a specific instance of one of Section 10's grounds. Indeed, on (2), one could argue that "willful misapplication of the law" is an instance of one of the statutory grounds in Section 10(4), namely, the case in which "the arbitrators . . . so imperfectly executed [their powers] that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012).
152 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 676-77. 153 Id. at 672 n.3. 154 Id. 157 Excession of powers was traditionally equated with "exceeding the submission," that is, the case in which an arbitrator decided on issues that were not properly submitted for arbitration, either because the parties themselves did not request an award on the issue, or because it is outside of the scope of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. See, e.g., De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall) 419, 430-31 (1866). After the FAA, the Supreme Court held close to the understanding that excession of powers is limited to cases in which the arbitrator strays from the agreement.
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the [agreement]; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the [agreement] . When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.
This limiting principle, however, has its own limits. It is based not on an arbitrator's actual knowledge that the award is not based on applicable law, but rather on the arbitrator's normative vision of applicable law. 158 Thus, this principle would not apply to an arbitrator who interprets a choice of law provision as valid (even if a court would not) and then applies that law to enforce the contract. Moreover, the principle would require some record of the arbitrator's reasoning-yet arbitrators are under no obligation to create one, or indeed provide any reason to support their award.
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A more robust limiting principle would be based not on subjective but on constructive knowledge, though, to be fair, such a standard might risk relitigation of every award. In any event, it remains to be seen precisely how this limiting principle applies to cases in which there is no evidence of the arbitrator's subjective beliefs or reasoning.
E. Conclusion
In summary, this Part chronicled the rise of federal arbitration preemption and the concomitant decline in states' authority to craft and enforce contract law. These developments, however, have practical effect only to the extent that contract parties agree to arbitrate their disputes. To the best of my knowledge, no previous study has presented nationally representative figures documenting the extent to which parties agree to arbitrate. The next Part thus endeavors to provide such figures for the first time.
II. NEW EVIDENCE ON THE PERVASIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
This Part presents new evidence on the pervasiveness of employment arbitration. Section A describes the data collection process, and Section B presents the results. 158 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 672 ("[T]he task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a contract, not to make public policy."). There are a handful of other, though much rarer, nonstatutory grounds upon which some lower courts have refused to enforce an award. See Reuben, supra note 136, at 1113-16 (summarizing these grounds).
159 Both U.S. courts and the American Arbitration Association leave it to the discretion of the parties and the arbitrator. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am., 363 U.S. at 598 ("Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award."); see also Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, R-46(b) (2013) ("The arbitrator need not render a reasoned award unless the parties request such an award in writing prior to appointment of the arbitrator or unless the arbitrator determines that a reasoned award is appropriate.").
A. Data Collection
I used standard natural language processing tools to create a dataset of roughly 800,000 contracts from all U.S. public companies between 1996 and 2016. The contracts come from filings submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In general, a company must file reports to the SEC if it has made a public offering or has "total assets exceeding $10,000,000 and a class of equity security . . . held [by at least] 2,000 persons." 160 Companies that report to the SEC must disclose any "contract not made in the ordinary course of business which is material to the [company] ." 161 This includes, among others, contracts to which directors and officers are parties. 162 Companies report material contracts by attaching them as exhibits to filings submitted to the SEC, such as on the periodic and interim reports submitted through forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K. 163 The SEC makes all filings since 1996 available online on the EDGAR database. 164 To recover the contracts, I wrote a program to search through all SEC filings. SEC filings use a unique code to identify material contracts. 165 Thus, this process recovered every contract disclosed to the SEC since 1996. I then parsed each contract for several variables: contract type, arbitration provision, and choice of law. The sample only includes contracts that are governed by the law of a U.S. state. Also, in the table below, I report the results for arbitration rates separately for the fifteen most common contract categories. These include fourteen distinct categories and a fifteenth category for "other."
A human-coded audit was conducted to check the accuracy of the machine coding. The audit checked the accuracy of the algorithm for choice of law and arbitration for 1000 randomly selected contracts. The algorithm successfully coded the choice of law clause for 98.1% of contracts. It also successfully coded the arbitration clause for 99.3% of contracts. Table 2 shows how arbitration rates vary by contract type. There are 791,362 total contracts in the sample. The average arbitration rate across all contracts is 19%.
B. Results
Employment agreements have the highest rate of arbitration, at 42%. The type of contract least likely to include an arbitration provision is credit agreements, at 4%. Employment agreements and credit agreements are also the two most common types of contracts in the sample. Each account for about 20% of all contracts disclosed to the SEC. Figure 2 presents the trend in arbitration rates over time. Specifically, it graphs the arbitration rate each year, separately for employment agreements and all others. "All others" thus includes the fourteen categories besides employment. The arbitration rate for employment and non-employment contracts has been roughly constant for the last twenty years.
I draw two conclusions from these data. First, employment arbitration is common, both in an absolute and relative sense. Second, given the stability of employment arbitration rates over time, it seems likely that employment arbitration will remain common in the future.
C. The Principal Challenge of Machine Learning in Empirical Legal Studies
Finally, it is worth reflecting on a limitation of this empirical section. The empirical section was initially motivated by the case of Nitro-Lift v. Howard (discussed in the Introduction), in which an employer used arbitration to enforce an otherwise invalid noncompete provision. In previous work, I had found that noncompetes were common even in jurisdictions that expressly void them. 166 The initial goal of the empirical section was thus to investigate the relationship between arbitration and noncompete provisions using machine learning protocols.
This goal, however, was not realized. A hand-coding audit revealed that the typical words and phrases used to craft noncompete provisions substantially overlapped with those of other common secrecy provisions, such as nonsolicitation and confidentiality provisions. For this reason, the standard machine learning protocols that successfully identified employment agreements and arbitration provisions were relatively unsuccessful at distinguishing noncompetes from other secrecy provisions.
This example speaks to a more general challenge-perhaps the principal challenge-facing scholars who use machine learning protocols to study legal texts. Loosely speaking, one might imagine a spectrum of questions to ask of a legal text, ranging from the very specific to the very general. On one extreme lie questions involving specific facts, such as: "Did the parties choose litigation or arbitration?" or "Who is the plaintiff?" On the other extreme lie questions involving very general concepts, such as: "Is this an employment contract?" or "Is this a judicial opinion?"
In my view, the literature has tended toward questions at these extremes because they are relatively well-suited to machine learning protocols-but the real action lies in the middle ground. In the middle ground are questions such as: "Have the parties agreed not to compete with each other?" or "Does the judicial opinion approve the use of legislative history?" These questions, while susceptible to reliable human coding, are tricky for the machine because they demand precise applications of broad concepts-such as "competition" or "statutory interpretation"-that evade algorithmic definition. Answering these questions with machine learning protocols would effectively enable scholars to apply (rudimentary) legal reasoning at scale. Thus, the challenge for the emerging literature that applies machine learning techniques is to resist the temptation of low-hanging questions lying at the extremes, and instead develop methods for addressing the more stubborn, yet perhaps more fruitful, questions that live in the middle. 
A. The Strategy: Deterrence over Enforcement
States cannot directly regulate arbitration, and the only way to change this is through congressional action. Congress has previously limited the scope of the FAA in several contexts, such as in motor vehicle franchise agreements, consumer credit agreements, whistleblower-related actions, and sales of securities (though some federal laws limiting the scope of the FAA were later repealed). 167 But recent efforts to enact limits to the FAA's reach 167 See, e.g., Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2) (2012) (invaliding agreements to arbitrate that would otherwise interfere with the Act's whistleblower incentives); Military Lending Act, Arbitration rate in the workplace, particularly to prohibit forced arbitration of sexual harassment, have been unsuccessful. Given the current congressional climate, it seems unlikely that these initiatives will be successful in the near future. 168 States, however, can act without Congress. To do so, they must change the way they enforce policies. Rather than relying on contract enforcement (or nonenforcement), states should deter formation of contracts that contravene public policy. I next consider two examples. The first example shows how states can indirectly enforce state policies on noncompetes by deterring parties from forming noncompete agreements (rather than directly enforcing the policy in contract actions). The second example shows how states can prevent mandatory arbitration of civil rights claims by deterring formation of certain types of arbitration agreements.
B. Example 1: Indirect Enforcement
The Case of Covenants Not to Compete
States place a variety of limits on the enforceability of noncompetes. Some states, such as California and Oklahoma, void noncompetes outright. 169 Nearly all other states enforce covenants not to compete in employment contracts as long as the restriction is "reasonable." The reasonableness test is typically formulated as a limitation on the time and geographic scope of the noncompete.
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The economic rationale for limiting freedom of contract in this way can be divided into two categories: to protect parties inside the contract and to protect parties outside the contract. 171 On the first, limiting enforcement of noncompetes protects vulnerable employees with little or no bargaining power. These employees are unlikely to have access to counsel, and therefore may not appreciate precisely how noncompetes limit their future employment. Indeed, a large body of empirical literature documents that laypersons do not read agreements or understand their contractual liabilities. 172 Thus, many employees may not even be aware that they are subject to a noncompete. Limiting enforcement of noncompetes also protects parties outside the contract. Noncompetes negatively affect society, as other employers are unable to hire persons subject to noncompetes. Thus, a policy of not enforcing noncompetes promotes labor market mobility and information spillovers, both of which generate innovation. 173 However, noncompetes may also produce welfare benefits. For example, they may incentivize employers to invest in their employees' human capital. 174 An optimal policy, therefore, must balance these competing interests.
The problem with states' noncompete policies, however, is that they are unenforceable in practice. Private parties can contract around them with arbitration and choice of law. This was the issue in Nitro-Lift v. Howard, as discussed in the Introduction. 175 That case involved an employee from Oklahoma, where noncompetes are categorically banned. The simple runaround required the employee to arbitrate under the laws of a jurisdiction that permits noncompetes-in that case, Louisiana. If the contract did not include an arbitration provision and were instead litigated, an Oklahoma state court would invalidate the choice of law provision, apply Oklahoma law, and thus void the noncompete. One might think that Oklahoma law would still be enforced so long as the arbitrator applies the correct conflict of laws analysis. The problem is that an arbitrator may not be so inclined. Indeed, the Supreme Court has all but encouraged arbitrators to ignore conflict of laws.
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The Policy Strategy
Given that the Supreme Court has effectively enabled parties to opt out of state policy, what should states do? Since states can do nothing about enforcement, the answer is that they should instead deter formation of noncompete agreements. For example, a state could issue civil fines against employers that form noncompetes with employees and enforce this by offering employees whistleblower rewards to report violations. The essential legal feature of this approach is that it creates a structure in which vindicating the policy (that is, eliminating noncompetes) does not require an action in contract. The creation of such a mechanism is necessary, since these actions will be sent to arbitration and cannot be monitored.
More generally, states should develop clear rules concerning noncompetes, and then prohibit formation of contracts that do not adhere to these rules. In this way, states may calibrate their noncompete policy without relying on arbitration for enforcement. Instead of using the ubiquitous "reasonableness" test of most jurisdictions, states should enact simple rules as to time and geography. For example, the maximum scope for, say, New York, might be "two years, within the state of New York, and within an industry defined by the Global Industrial Standard Classification." Then, New York could adopt the same mechanism-a whistleblower incentive for employees-to deter formation of agreements that exceed these clear limits.
No state has expressly adopted such an approach, but some states have come close. In the Illinois Freedom to Work Act, Illinois recently prohibited noncompetes for "low-wage" employees (defined by the employee's hourly wages). 177 The problem with this law is that it was not coupled with an easy mechanism for private enforcement-i.e., whistleblower incentives of the kind explained above. Further, there is no clear schedule of fines associated with violations. There is therefore little to deter employers from flouting the prohibition, especially against uninformed employees.
The first high-profile suit brought by the Illinois Attorney General under the shadow of the new Illinois statute demonstrates its limits. 178 The suit challenged the sandwich chain Jimmy John's and its practice of including noncompetes in its contracts with rank-and-file employees. 179 Illinois's position was that these noncompetes were not permitted under existing common law. 180 Jimmy John's "defense" was that, even if the noncompetes were unenforceable, it never tried to enforce the noncompete. 181 This is nonsense. The power of a noncompete against a rank-and-file employee is in the threat, not the execution. Thus, an employer could include the provision in a standard form contract, never enforce it, and still discourage at least some employees from competing. Further, even a sophisticated rank-and-file employee who knows her legal obligations may hesitate to "breach" this unenforceable agreement, if only for fear of costly arbitration. In the settlement, Jimmy John's agreed to pay $100,000 to raise awareness of the new noncompete law. Without a robust whistleblower regime, however, it is difficult to see how this will deter future violations of the new statute.
C. Example 2: Preventing (Mandatory) Arbitration
The Case of Civil Rights Claims
Arbitration provisions in employment contracts are typically broad in scope, providing for arbitration for "any dispute" that arises during employment. Until recently, it was not clear whether such provisions could lawfully include all civil rights claims.
The question was settled in 1991. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that employers and employees can specifically enforce predispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 182 Then, later in the same year, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In it, Congress specifically encourages arbitration of all civil rights claims: "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, . . . and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title."
183 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first express statement by the Congress in support of a "national policy favoring arbitration."
Employers and employees are both enabled and encouraged to keep civil rights claims out of public courts. Yet states and the public have an interest in encouraging the opposite. They have an interest in both monitoring enforcement of civil rights in the workplace and affording employees certain procedural protections. Given these interests, how can states bring civil rights disputes back into public courts?
The Policy Strategy
The strategy is to craft a law that does not interfere with the arbitral process-and therefore avoids preemption. Any law must allow arbitration of civil rights claims to proceed. For example, a simple law prohibiting mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims-such as the one recently passed by New York 184 -would, if challenged, surely be preempted by the FAA.
Further complicating the issue, even if states could prohibit arbitration of all civil rights claims, it is not obvious whether they should. Some employees may prefer to arbitrate their civil rights claims, and so compelling public litigation in such cases may only compound the harm. In principle, therefore, state policy should be designed to empower employees to choose their forum after the dispute has arisen, or, equivalently, to incentivize employers to grant employees this option.
States can achieve this by first prohibiting civil rights as a subject matter for contracts. After enacting this prohibition, the law could then carve out an exemption for post-dispute agreements so that parties may still settle existing claims. An example of such a law is as follows:
(1) No person shall enter into an agreement with any employee concerning the civil rights of the employee. All such agreements are illegal and void.
(2) Section 1 shall not apply to agreements concerning existing legal claims.
Private enforcement could then proceed as in the noncompete example. For example, employees could be empowered to bring a qui tam action on behalf of the state to enforce the law. Even if a state does not intervene, these actions cannot be sent to arbitration. 185 To implement this, states can simply copy existing state and federal statutes that enable qui tam actions. 186 This law is not preempted by the FAA for several reasons. First, the law does not "derive [its] meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue."
187 Rather, it derives its meaning from the fact that the subject matter of the agreement relates to the employee's civil rights. Indeed, employers can violate this law with or without requiring employees to arbitrate civil rights disputes; further, employers may still require employees to arbitrate civil rights disputes even under this law.
To see this, consider the following examples. Suppose an employment contract prohibits the employee from disclosing any instance of sexual harassment. This contract violates the law regardless of whether it includes an arbitration agreement, and so the employer would be subject to civil penalties. Next suppose an employment contract includes an agreement to arbitrate and the employee files suit against the employer alleging sexual harassment. Under the FAA, a court would be compelled to submit the claim to arbitration-leaving the arbitrator to decide whether the arbitration may procced. The proposed law does nothing to alter this result. Instead, it only subjects the employer to fines that the state itself may collect directly from the employer. Again, these fines are not a consequence of the arbitration agreement. They arise because the employer contracted over the employee's civil rights.
The law also does not interfere with the "fundamental attributes" of arbitration or "disfavor[] contracts that (oh so coincidentally) have the defining features of arbitration agreements." 188 The law does not regulate any aspect of the arbitral process or enable a court to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement under any circumstance.
Though this Article does not advocate it, it is worth considering an even simpler approach: prohibiting employment contracts altogether. There are many legal and economic arguments one might make against such a "brute force" law. Yet there is no argument that such a law would be preempted by the FAA since, as per the Supreme Court's requirement, 189 it expressly applies to "any" contract. It does not "single out" arbitration. 190 Finally, it is worth observing that policies like the one suggested herethat is, prohibitions of certain classes of contracts-are commonplace. Two examples that come to mind are prohibitions on agreements to collude among competitors 191 and prohibitions on bribery contracts between American companies and foreign governments.
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CONCLUSION
This Article showed how the last fifty years of Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence has effectively enabled employers and employees to opt out of mandatory state law. It also presented new evidence on the pervasiveness of employment arbitration by parsing millions of filings with the SEC to create a database of nearly 800,000 contracts. Among all types of contracts-purchases, joint ventures, credit agreements, and othersemployment agreements are by far the most likely to include an arbitration provision.
In response to these trends, I offered a new strategy to states to regulate arbitration. Federal law would preempt any direct state effort to regulate arbitration or prohibit employment disputes from being arbitrated. I therefore proposed that states abandon contract enforcement as a policy lever, and instead focus on deterring formation of contracts that would undermine state policy.
